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EVIDENCE
George W Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY-CHARACTER TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Character of the Accused-Reputation Testimony
State v. Frentz' is a really splendid opinion by Justice
Tate. It etches out the major aspects of the law relative to
character evidence admissible for the purpose of proving or
disproving the guilt of the accused, distinguishing and deline-
ating the rules relative to reputation testimony admissible to
prove or disprove the credibility of a witness. The value of the
opinion goes much beyond its mere holding, for the court uses
the problem presented in Frentz as a vehicle for "laying out"
the law relative to character and reputation evidence generally.
Defendant had been charged with aggravated crime
against nature with a person under the age of seventeen. The
defendant, said the supreme court, had introduced testimony
putting his character at issue with respect to the trait of homo-
sexuality. To rebut, the state, over objection, elicited testi-
mony from a police officer summarizing the opinion of an un-
named third party as to defendant's reputation as a homosex-
ual. The supreme court very properly held that the police offi-
cer's testimony was improper, that it violated the rules relative
to the admissibility of character evidence, and that it consti-
tuted inadmissible hearsay. The writers fully agree.
Character of the Victim to Show Who Was Aggressor
State v. Boss' is a very interesting case relative to the
character of the victim.' Following State v. Lee,' the court
differentiated between evidence admissible to show that the
defendant acted in self-defense and evidence admissible to
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
1. 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978).
2. 353 So. 2d 241 (La. 1977).
3. See also State v. Bernard, 358 So. 2d 1268 (La. 1978).
4. 331 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).
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show that the victim was the aggressor.5 Of importance, the
court took the position that the admissibility of evidence to
show that the victim was the aggressor is not dependent upon
the defendant's having known of such evidence at the time of
the alleged crime. The court held, however, that since here one
is dealing with character of the victim as bearing upon the
probability of his having acted in a particular way,' evidence
of such character is limited to general reputation, and particu-
lar acts against third parties are inadmissible.' Although the
writers agree that in most instances proof of the victim's char-
acter to show that he was the first aggressor should be limited
to reputation only, cases may well arise where the proffered
evidence would have such a high probative value that such a
limitation would violate a defendant's constitutional right to
make out his defense.8 For example, Revised Statutes 15:479
should not preclude a defendant's showing that the victim was
the first aggressor when he could demonstrate that the defen-
dant had a plan to chastise or liquidate the members of a
particular family and that he had in fact that very day carried
out the plan as to several members of the class.
Character of Victim-Reputation for Chastity in Sexual
Assault Cases
In State v. Frentz' the court quite properly differentiated
between reputation testimony that is relevant and admissible
to prove or disprove material elements of the crime charged
(hereafter called probability evidence) and reputation testi-
5. State v. Lee is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. Rzv. 575, 576 (1977), reprinted in G. PUGH,
LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAw 68 (Supp. 1978), and Note, Character and Prior Conduct of
the Victim in Support of a Plea of Self-Defense, 37 LA. L. REv. 1166 (1977), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra, at 62.
6. On the distinction between evidence relevant to prove that a fact is probable
and evidence relevant to prove that a witness is credible, see note 10, infra.
7. The court in this connection relied upon LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950), which states:
"Character, whether good or bad, depends upon the general reputation that a man has
among his neighbors, not upon what particular persons think of him."
8. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REv. 525,
544 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 154.
9. 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978).
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mony relevant and admissible on the issue of credibility of a
witness (hereafter called credibility evidence).'" Frentz recog-
nizes that different rules apply to the admissibility of evidence
offered under one or the other theory. Of course, at times evi-
dence may be relevant to the ultimate issues in the case, as well
as to the credibility of a witness, but under applicable rules
may be admissible under either or both theories, or neither.
Problems in this area are especially challenging when they
concern the prior sexual history of the victim in a sexual assault
case. To what extent, if at all, should the accused be permitted
to inquire into the prior sexual history and reputation of the
alleged victim? This very delicate and serious issue has engen-
dered much discussion and legislation, especially recently." In
1975 the Louisiana Legislature adopted a rather confusing pro-
vision (Revised Statutes 15:498)2 concerning the problem.
It is unclear to these writers whether Revised Statutes
15:498, relative to the reputation and prior sexual conduct of
alleged victims of sexual assault, addresses itself to credibility
of the alleged victim as a witness or to the likelihood or unlike-
lihood of the charged crimes having occurred. Although the
caption of the section speaks in terms of impeachment and the
section is placed with the provisions relative to credibility of
witnesses, 3 rather than with those governing the admissibility
of evidence on probability, 4 the section itself speaks in very
broad, embracive terms that might be interpreted to apply to
10. For the distinction between probability and credibility evidence, see and
compare Rules 106 and 306 of the American Law Institute's MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
(1942). See also M. LADD AND R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 232
(1972).
11. See, e.g., Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Davis, Character Evidence in Rape Cases, 1976
N.Z.L.J. 178; Herman, What's Wrong with Rape Reform Laws?, Civ. LiB. REV., Dec.
1976/Jan. 1977, at 60; Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1976); Comment, Evidence-Impeaching Credibility-Prior
Sexual Experience, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 155 (1976); Comment, Due Process Challenge to
Restrictions on the Substantive Use of Evidence of a Rape Prosecutrix's Prior Sexual
Conduct, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 443 (1976). See also State ex. rel. Pope v. Superior Ct.,
113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946, discussed in Note, 1976 ARIz. ST. L. J. 213.
12. 1975 La. Acts, No. 732, adding LA. R.S. 15:498.
13. LA. R.S. 15:484-97 (1950); LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp. 1975).
14. LA. R.S. 15:479-83 (1950).
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probability as well as credibility: "Evidence of prior sexual
conduct and reputation for chastity of a victim of rape or carnal
knowledge shall not be admissible except for incidents arising
out of the victim's relationship with the accused."
If the statute is interpreted to be a limitation on defen-
dant's ability to establish that the victim of the alleged rape
had consented to sexual intercourse and hence that no rape had
in fact occurred, the provision under certain circumstances
would be a severe limitation upon defendant's right to make
out his defense and might well violate his constitutional right
of compulsory process.15
On the other hand, if the statute is interpreted as applying
solely to impeachment of the alleged victim as a witness, then
it would not necessarily preclude the defendant from adducing
testimony as to the alleged victim's prior sexual history when
the same has a particularized relevance on the issue of proba-
bility. It might, however, still be constitutionally suspect under
certain circumstances as constituting an undue limitation on
the right of the defendant to confront the witnesses against
him. 6 If, for example, under the hypothetical posed in footnote
fifteen, the alleged victim on the stand denies that she had
consented to the sexual intercourse, defendant should not be
precluded from inquiring into some, at least, of the facts de-
tailed.
15. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973.1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REv. 525, 544
(1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 154. As an example of a case in which
the problem would be presented, assume that a man and a woman in a bedroom are
surprised by the police in a most embarrassing situation. Assume further that the
woman, on seeing the police, cries "rape." Assume that defendant's defense is that the
woman had consented to sexual intercourse for a stipulated prepaid fee. At an ensuing
trial for rape, is the defendant by the 1975 act to be precluded from adducing testimony
that the woman was widely reputed in the community to be a prostitute, that the
premises involved had been used regularly during the prior months by the "victim"
as a house of prostitution, and that several other designated men had had similar
relations with the "victim" during the prior week? If so, the goddess of justice would
have no need of a blindfold; the statute would suffice.
16. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 538
(1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 168, and The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REv. 575, 586 (1977),
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 165.
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As with the privacy of other alleged victims, it is desirable
to strike an appropriate balance between the interest of the
accused and that of the prosecution and the alleged victim. 7
Through the years prior to the 1975 enactment, Louisiana
courts had developed a body of rules for the protection of the
privacy of alleged rape victims." They did not, however, go as
far as the 1975 act. Although the writers are thoroughly sensi-
tive to societal interest in affording appropriate safeguards to
the privacy of victims of sexual assault and are completely
sympathetic with the terrible plight of the victims of such hei-
nous crimes, it is submitted that the very broad language of the
1975 act goes too far.
State v. Domangue9 was the first case decided under the
1975 act. Under the facts set forth in the opinion, there was no
suggestion that the alleged victim's prior sexual history had
any particularized relevance to the alleged attempted aggra-
vated rape or to the credibility of the victim as a witness.
Without discussing the constitutional and other problems that
might arise in different contexts, the court upheld the trial
court's refusal to permit defendant to "inquire into the victim's
past sexual relationships with men other than her common law
husband and the defendant."20 It is anticipated that future
cases will present some of the ramifying problems suggested
above. The problem is scheduled for exploration in a student
piece in a later issue of this Review.
Expert Witness as to Psychological Incapacity
Is it possible in Louisiana for a defendant to adduce expert
testimony that defendant's psychological makeup is such that
he is incapable of committing the crime charged? The matter
has been considered elsewhere in the country and is the subject
of conflicting approaches. 2'
17. See LA. R.S. 15:482 (Supp. 1952).
18. See State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973), and authorities collected therein.
See also the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-
1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 530 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
5, at 73.
19. 350 So. 2d 599 (La. 1977).
20. Id. at 601.
21. See People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954), and Falknor and
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In State v. Mallett" the defense attempted to adduce testi-
mony "as to whether defendant was psychologically capable of
committing the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a
juvenile where the juvenile was his son. '2 3 Although the su-
preme court upheld the trial court's refusal to permit the defen-
dant to introduce the offered evidence, it did not base its ruling
upon the inadmissibility of such testimony generally. Instead
it held that the foundation required for expert testimony in
Louisiana had not been laid-the witness (a chiropractor and
social psychologist) had not stated the facts upon which his
opinion was based. The implication appears to be that a quali-
fied expert in the area, after appropriate examination of defen-
dant and after giving the facts upon which he based his opin-
ion, could properly testify to defendant's purported psychologi-
cal incapacity to commit the crime charged. Whether or not the
supreme court will hereafter so hold must await future develop-
ments.
RELEvANCY-OTHER CRIMES OR WRONGFUL ACTS COMMITTED BY
THE ACCUSED
Intent
It is clear from State v. Nelson" that for "other crimes"
evidence to come in to show "intent," whether the requisite
intent was present must be "a real and genuine contested issue
at trial."" The mere fact that specific intent is a necessary
element of the crime charged does not suffice. Such a determi-
nation should preferably be made in advance of trial.6
Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the "Couch
of the Psychiatrist," 102 U. PA. L. REv. 980 (1954). See also 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
569 (3d ed. 1940).
22. 357 So. 2d 1105 (La. 1978).
23. Id. at 1110.
24. 357 So. 2d 1100 (La. 1978).
25. Id. at 1103. See also State v. Holstead, 354 So. 2d 493 (La. 1977); State v.
Carter, 352 So. 2d 607 (La. 1977).
26. See State v. Herman, 358 So. 2d 1282 (La. 1978); State v. Nelson, 357 So.
2d 1100, 1103 n.2 (La. 1978); State v. Carter, 352 So. 2d 607, 614 n.14 (La. 1977).
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System
In State v. Frentz, " a prosecution of defendant for aggra-
vated crime against nature with a person under seventeen years
of age, 2s a majority of the court held that it was improper for
the state to show other similar acts with other juveniles at the
same location, for under the facts presented it was clear that
the juvenile involved and the defendant were at defendant's
home at the time charged. In so holding, the court quoted with
approval from State v. Ledet:21
[W]hen there is no contest at all over the participation
of the accused in the alleged incident, but the only ques-
tion is whether any crime at all took place, evidence of
extraneous offenses serves only to establish that defendant
is capable of and thus likely to have committed the crime
in question, and as such the evidence is inadmissible.'"
"Res Gestae"
When is another crime so much a part of the "res gestae"
of the charged crime that the Prieur3' notice need not be given?
In State v. Schwartz 2 the court made it clear that a very close
relationship is required, indicating that the other crime must
be so closely connected with the charged crime and so bound
up with it that charging the defendant with the instant crime
must be realistically deemed to have given him notice of the
other offense as well. The test laid down seems very appropri-
ate.3
27. 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978).
28. See also State v. Jackson, 352 So. 2d 195 (La. 1978) (prior distribution of
drugs).
29. 345 So. 2d 474 (La. 1977). This case is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv. 567, 569 (1978).
30. 345 So. 2d at 479. State v. Ledet is quoted with approval in State v. Frentz,
354 So. 2d 1007, 1009 (La. 1978).
31. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
32. 354 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1978).
33. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REv. 525, 578, 604 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
5, at 99.
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Identity
Several recent cases' concern the admissibility of "other
crimes" evidence to show the identity of the perpetrator of the
charged crime. The applicable test is set forth in State v.
Lewis' 5 as follows: "In order to be admissible to prove identity
the other crimes must be distinctively similar in system,"3" or,
continued the court, "so peculiarly distinctive that one must
logically say that [the two crimes] are the work of the same
person."3 Different factual shadings, however, make such a
test difficult to apply.38
Drug Addiction as Motive for Armed Robbery
In an excellent opinion authored by Justice Dennis, the
court in State v. Sutfield" held that it was reversible error in
an armed robbery case for the state to introduce evidence
(track marks) to show that defendant was a heroin addict and
hence needed money to support his habit. In so holding, the
court applied Professor McCormick's balancing test:
[T]he problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but one
of balancing, on the one side, the actual need for the other
crimes evidence in the light of the issues and the other
evidence available to the prosecution, the convincingness
of the evidence that the other crimes were committed and
that the accused was the actor, and the strength or weak-
ness of the other crimes evidence in supporting the issue,
and on the other, the degree to which the jury will proba-
34. State v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978); State v. Mitchell, 356 So. 2d 974
(La. 1978); State v. Jackson, 352 So. 2d 195 (La. 1977).
35. 358 So. 2d 1285, 1287 (La. 1978).
36. For the quoted proposition the court cited the following cases: State v. Jack-
son, 352 So. 2d 195 (La. 1977); State v. Slayton, 338 So. 2d 694 (La. 1976); State v.
Waddles, 336 So. 2d 810 (La. 1976); State v. Hicks, 301 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974).
37. State v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d at 1287, quoting State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339, 1345
(La. 1976) (Dennis, J., concurring).
38. See e.g., State v. Mitchell, 356 So. 2d 974 (La. 1978), where, over vigorous
protests, the majority held that the required test had been met.
39. 354 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978).
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bly be roused by the evidence to overmastering hostility.
(Footnotes omitted.) McCormick, § 190, p. 453.40
The court said that "[w]ithout additional evidence indicating
a motive to commit the particular crime involving the particu-
lar victim, heroin addiction should not be admitted to prove
motive."" In so holding, the court adopted a view contrary to
that reflected in the 1973 case of State v. St. Amand.42 The St.
Amand case, however, was not discussed. In light of Sutfield,
it is interesting to speculate as to whether in a prosecution for
armed robbery for morphine at a drugstore, the court will hold
inadmissible the fact of defendant's morphine addiction. A
more particularized motive would be present, but not for the
burglary of that particular drugstore.
Unresponsive Answers by Police Officers
In State v. Schwartz 3 the court indicated in a footnote
that a majority may now be ready to hold the prosecution
responsible for unresponsive answers by police officers impli-
cating the defendant in unrelated inadmissible other crimes.
Justice Dennis, speaking for the court, stated with grave con-
cern that the officer "whose testimony gratuitously implicated
the defendant in other crimes, has given similar 'unresponsive
answers' in other cases which have been reviewed by this
court."" He then went on to observe: "The recurrence of such
testimony by experienced and knowledgeable witnesses . . .
establishes too clear a pattern for this court to continue to
excuse the highly prejudicial unresponsive remarks as being
inadvertent, unplanned or unexpected by prosecuting attor-
40. Id. at 1337 n.1. See also State v. Burnette, 353 So. 2d 989 (La. 1978); State
v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
41. 354 So. 2d at 1337.
42. 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973). This case is discussed in Comment, Other Crimes
Evidence in Louisiana-I. To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc. in the Case in
Chief, 33 LA. L. REv. 614 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 30 n.67. See
also Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-II. To Attack the Credibility of
the Defendant on Cross-Examination, 33 LA. L. REv. 630 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH,
supra note 5, at 111 n.67.
43. 354 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1978).
44. Id. at 1333 n.2. State v. Schwartz is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REv. 656, 657 (1976).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
neys." 5 It is to be hoped that police academies and district
attorneys will effectively caution police officer witnesses to
avoid mentioning inadmissible other crimes.
Joinder and Severance of Offenses for Trial
In 1975 the Louisiana Legislature authorized broad joinder
of offenses." In several of the cases decided in the past year 7
the court grappled with the problem of reconciling the new
statute with the earlier Prieur line of cases. In the most impor-
tant of these cases, State v. Carter," Justice Calogero, speaking
for four members of the court in a very well-reasoned opinion,
succinctly concluded that
when crimes, which have been joined simply because they
are the same or similar character offenses, are indeed le-
gitimate "other crimes" under Prieur and its progeny (the
offenses are sufficiently similar, the evidence is relevant to
a real issue in each case, and the prejudicial effect of the
evidence does not outweigh its probative value), a decision
not to sever the crimes will normally be proper. Con-
versely, we hold that when offenses, which have been
joined solely because they are same or similar character
offenses, are not legitimate "other crimes" under Prieur
and its progeny, they should normally be severed upon
pretrial motion of the accused or the state."
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
"Opening the Door" to Cross-examination as to Prior Arrests
When a defendant on direct examination has the audacity
45. 354 So. 2d at 1333 n.2.
46. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 493-95.1, as amended by 1975 La. Acts, No. 528. For
an excellent discussion of joinder and severance problems, see Comment, Joinder of
Offenses: Louisiana's New Approach in Historical Perspective, 37 LA. L. REv. 203
(1976).
47. See State v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978); State v. Cramer, 358 So. 2d
1277 (La. 1978); State v. Nelson, 357 So. 2d 1100 (La. 1978); State v. Mitchell, 356
So. 2d 974 (La. 1978); State v. Holstead, 354 So. 2d 493 (La. 1977); State v. Proctor,
354 So. 2d 488 (La. 1977); State v. Carter, 352 So. 2d 607 (La. 1977).
48. 352 So. 2d 607 (La. 1977).
49. Id. at 614.
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to assert "that he had never 'been in any kind of trouble with
the law' in his life,"" does he thereby "open the door" to cross-
examination as to whether he has been previously arrested?5'
Over the dissenting opinion of Justice Dennis, a majority of the
court appears to have held in the affirmative in State v.
Betancourt. 52
The court apparently concluded that by making such a
sweeping assertion on the stand the defendant had precluded
himself from complaining on appeal that the trial court had
permitted the prosecution to meet such defense testimony."
Whether this is, in fact, the position of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, however, is not clear, for with respect to a remarkably
similar line of questioning in State v. Anderson,54 the court
relied upon other grounds for upholding the trial court's refusal
to grant a mistrial when a question about prior arrests was
asked the defendant on cross-examination.
Even if it is ultimately decided that a defendant, by such
testimony on direct, "opens the door" to cross-questioning as
to prior arrests, the writers believe that the prosecution could
not properly introduce extrinsic evidence to disprove the truth-
fulness of defendant's answer. When, prior to the 1952 amend-
ment to Revised Statutes 15:495, the prosecution was permit-
ted to attack a witness's credibility via cross-examination as to
prior arrests, the prosecution was "bound by the answer" and
could not disprove it by extrinsic evidence. 5
Scope of Cross-examination-When is the Accused a
"Witness"?
Revised Statutes 15:46211 provides that when an accused
becomes a witness at the trial, he thereby subjects himself to
cross-examination on the entire case." If, instead of taking the
50. State v. Betancourt, 351 So. 2d 1187 (La. 1977).
51. See LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952).
52. 351 So. 2d 1187 (La. 1977).
53. For an excellent discussion of "opening the door," see C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 57, at 131 (Cleary ed. 1972).
54. 358 So. 2d 276 (La. 1978). This case is discussed in text at note 69, infra.
55. See State v. Vastine, 172 La. 137, 133 So. 389 (1931).
56. LA. R.S. 15:462 (1950).
57. But see the approach taken in State v. Lovett, 345 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977),
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stand to make assertive statements relative to the alleged
crime, defendant seeks merely to demonstrate that he does not
possess a physical attribute associated with the perpetrator of
the alleged crime, does he become a "witness" within the
meaning of Revised Statutes 15:462? In State v. Tillett5 a pros-
ecution witness had testified that the alleged robber had a
Spanish accent. The court held that reversible error was com-
mitted when the trial court refused to permit the defendant to
try to demonstrate that he did not have such an accent. In so
holding, the court relied on cases declaring that an accused's
privilege against self-incrimination is not infringed by forcing
him to perform non-testimonial acts.
Cross-examination by Accused as to Prosecution Witness's
Prior Acts of Misconduct
There is a certain tension between recognizing a defen-
dant's right of confrontation and protecting a state's witness's
legitimate interest in privacy. Louisiana has gone far to protect
a defendant from prosecutorial cross-questioning about extra-
neous acts of misconduct where the purpose of such question-
ing is a general attack upon the veracity of the defendant as a
witness. 9 Is the defendant to be similarly limited when he seeks
to cross-examine state's witnesses? The question underlay
State v. Anderson" and divided the court."' Under the circum-
stances there presented, the majority held that defendant had
no right to cross-examine the victim of an alleged robbery-
kidnapping about prior homosexual acts with persons other
than the defendant.6 2 Contrary to the victim's version of the
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977
Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv. 567, 587 (1978). The Lovett case was disapproved by
the legislature in Act 746 of 1978, amending Code of Criminal Procedure article 703(B).
58. 351 So. 2d 1153 (La. 1977).
59. See State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972.1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REv. 443, 453
(1974), reprinted in G. PUoH, supra note 5, at 169.
60. 358 So. 2d 276 (La. 1978).
61. See also State v. Marshall, 359 So. 2d 78 (La. 1978).
62. See also in this connection LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp. 1975), the recently enacted
statute regarding an analogous problem, questioning an alleged rape victim about prior
sexual conduct with persons other than the accused.
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alleged incident, defendant contended that the matter had ari-
sen out of the victim's efforts to secure a homosexual relation-
ship with the defendant. Two justices dissented, taking the
position that defendant's right of confrontation had been vio-
lated. Whether or not the majority or dissenting position was
correct under the facts presented, it seems clear that because
of the confrontation clauses,63 defendant's right of cross-
examination of a state's witness and right to adduce extrinsic
evidence to attack the credibility of a state's witness may at
times be broader than the prosecution's right to cross-examine
and attack the credibility of a defense witness. Statutes creat-
ing testimonial privileges and restricting attacks upon credibil-
ity of a witness are necessarily limited pro tanto by the confron-
tation clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 64
Prejudicial Effect of Unanswered Question-Questioning
Defendant About Prior Arrests
Revised Statutes 15:495 was amended in 195265 expressly
to prohibit the admissibility of evidence of prior arrests to im-
peach a witness. The purpose of the amendment, says State v.
Carite,66 was
to clothe the accused with a mantle of protection against
any evidence of prior arrests for the reason that the infer-
63. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REv. 443, 448 (1974), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra
note 5, at 155, and The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REv. 344, 345 (1972), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5,
at 91.
64. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and the discussion in. The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv. 567,
580 (1977).
65. LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952) provides:
Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is
admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, but
before evidence of such former conviction can be adduced from any other source
than the witness whose credibility is to be impeached, he must have been ques-
tioned on cross-examination as to such conviction, and have failed distinctly to
admit the same; and no witness, whether he be defendant or not, can be asked
on cross-examination whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and
can only be questioned as to conviction, and as provided herein.
66. 244 La. 928, 155 So. 2d 21 (1963).
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ence and innuendo flowing therefrom are prejudicial. If
the jury is told that the accused was arrested for posses-
sion of narcotics once, the implication is that the accused
would do it again. It furthermore destroys the accused's
credibility in the minds of the jury. Any other result would
fail to comprehend the realities of the case and the preju-
dice to the accused ensuing from such a statement which
the legislature in adopting the codal article clearly recog-
nized. 7
Is reversible error committed when a defendant who has taken
the stand on his own behalf is asked on cross-examination
whether he has ever been arrested? The writers feel that the
implications from the question are so prejudicial and that the
law is so very clear on the point, that in a jury trial, and per-
haps even in a nonjury trial, the mere asking of the question
should necessitate a reversal. Forcing defense counsel to object
to such a question definitely signals to the trier of fact that
defendant is trying to hide one or more arrests, and we are all
too prone to equate an arrest or indictment with guilt."
The problem is a serious one and has been before the court
in various forms many times. Understandably the court, is hesi-
tant to require a new trial, especially so when guilt may be
clear. On the other hand, how else is the legislative purpose to
be achieved?
The matter was again before the court in State v.
Anderson,' a nonjury trial. Relying on State v. Hatch,70 the
court differentiated between questions which are themselves
assertive and those which are "purely interrogatory" in charac-
ter. Finding that the question involved was a "pure question"
and noting that "moreover" it was a judge rather than a jury
67. Id. at 933-34, 155 So. 2d at 23.
68. See State v. Gaspard, 301 So. 2d 344 (La. 1974). See also The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Evidence, 27 LA. L. REv. 551, 552
(1967), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 129; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1961-1962 Term-Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 406, 409 (1963), reprinted in
G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 100; and Note, Prejudicial Effect of Unanswered Question,
19 LA. L. REV. 881 (1959), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 95.
69. 358 So. 2d 276 (La. 1978).
70. 305 So. 2d 497 (La. 1974).
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trial, the court found that the trial court had not erred when,
after sustaining defense counsel's objection, it denied his mo-
tion for a mistrial. The defendant in Anderson was certainly
not in an exceptionally meritorious position, for on direct ex-
amination he had apparently testified that he had not been in
any trouble since 1966 (when he had been released from An-
gola) and may well have thus "opened the door" to the question
asked on cross-examination. Further, the fact that the trial in
question was a bench trial rather than a jury trial certainly
mitigates the prejudice.7' Nevertheless, the writers submit that
if the salutary purposes of Revised Statutes 15:495 are to be
achieved, perhaps the only effective way is for the supreme
court to insist upon a mistrial when a prosecutor on cross-
examination asks a witness whether he has ever been arrested.72
As persons trained in the law, prosecutors should be held to
obey the simple rule that has been embodied in 15:495 for the
last twenty-six years. It may well be that requiring a new trial
may be the only way to achieve the legislative purpose.
Questioning Defendant About Whether Police Witness Lying
The court forcefully reiterated in State v. Duke 3 that it
deems it improper for the prosecution to ask a defendant on
cross-examination whether a police officer testifying contrary
to defendant was lying. The court noted that it had so stated
on several prior occasions and indicated considerable impati-
ence with prosecutorial persistence in such questioning. It said
that although in the past it had not held such improper ques-
tioning reversible error, the continuance of such questioning
might "require us to re-examine our holdings to this effect."7
71. See Levin and Cohen, The Exclusionary Rule in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119
U. PA. L. REv. 905 (1971). See also authorities collected in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REv. 575, 575 n.2 (1977),
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 1.
72. For an analogous problem, see the discussion of volunteered remarks by a
police officer about a defendant's other crimes in State v. Schwartz, 354 So. 2d 1332,
1333 n.2 (La. 1978), discussed in text at note 43, supra.
73. 358 So. 2d 293 (La. 1978).
74. Id. at 295.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ArACKING CREDIBILITY
Credibility-Reputation Testimony
Recently, in State v. Walker, 5 the supreme court appro-
priately held that with respect to reputation testimony on the
question of probability,"0 defendant's character witness, al-
though apparently unable to testify to defendant's community-
wide reputation, could nonetheless properly testify to defen-
dant's reputation among long-standing co-workers at his place
of employment. In so holding, the court gave a liberal interpre-
tation to Revised Statutes 15:479."1 The writers feel that a simi-
lar liberal interpretation should be given to analogous language
in Revised Statutes 15:4908 and 4911" relative to reputation
testimony admissible on the issue of credibility of a witness.
A doubt is raised by the recent case of State v. Trosclair8°
which concerned a credibility attack on a state's witness, an
effort by defendant to show that the witness bore a bad reputa-
tion among bar owners. Without discussing Walker, the court
found the attack to have been improper. The testimony in-
volved seemed to be of very dubious utility, and the writers
agree that it should have been rejected. The reputation of the
witness in that small, limited segment of the community was
of insufficient value to Warrant its admissibility. The writers
hope, however, that Trosclair will not be regarded as a rejection
of the approach taken in Walker-that, instead, it will be
viewed merely as a rejection of the questionable evidence in-
volved in Trosclair.
75. 334 So. 2d 205 (La. 1976). This case is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv. 567, 571 (1978).
76. With respect to the distinction between evidence of credibility and evidence
of probability, see notes 6 and 10, supra.
77. LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950) provides: "Character, whether good or bad, depends
upon the general reputation that a man has among his neighbors, not upon what
particular persons think of him."
78. LA. R.S. 15:490 (1950) provides: "The credibility of a witness may be at-
tacked generally by showing that his general reputation for truth or for moral character
is bad, or it may be attacked only in so far as his credibility in the case on trial is
concerned."
79. LA. R.S, (1950) 15:491 provides: "When the general credibility is attacked,
the inquiry must be limited to general reputation, and can not go into particular acts,
vices or courses of conduct."
80. 350 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1977).
[Vol. 39
1979] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978 971
Reputation Testimony-Significance of Absence of Discussion
Louisiana courts have long held that "the fact that the
reputation of an accused has never been discussed in the com-
munity in which he lives is admissible as evidence of good
character."'" Further, "[t]he court has held 2 that under cer-
tain circumstances the jury should be instructed as to the fa-
vorable inference that can be drawn from non-discussion. '8 3
When a character witness who purports to be familiar with
defendant's reputation is called by defendant, may he testify
that the defendant's reputation is good even though he has
never heard it discussed? For example, would a longtime friend
and colleague of General Washington have been permitted to
testify that Washington's reputation as to honesty was good,
even though he had never heard it in any way talked about. A
majority of the jurisdictions hold that he could."
The matter has been the subject of varying and conflicting
pronouncements by the Louisiana courts through the years. 5 In
1956, in State v. Howard," the court, without citing the 1936
case of State v. Pace87 and relying upon earlier contrary author-
ity, held that a character witness's concession that he had not
heard the defendant's character discussed precluded his testi-
fying as to his reputation. In 1977, relying on State v. Howard
and the 1915 decision in State v. Warren,8  the court in State
v. George" held that the fact that the character witness has
never heard the reputation discussed precludes his expressing
his opinion as to what the reputation is. The following year, in
81. State v. George, 346 So. 2d 694, 701 (La. 1977). See also State v. Daniels,
262 La. 475, 263 So. 2d 859 (1972); State v. Pace, 183 La. 838, 165 So. 6 (1936); State
v. Ciaccio, 163 La. 563, 112 So. 486 (1927).
82. State v. Emory, 151 La. 152, 91 So. 659 (1922). See also State v. Leming, 217
La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262 (1950), and State v. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
83. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1955-1956
Term-Evidence, 17 LA. L. REv. 421, 424 (1957), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5,
at 24, 27.
84. See the discussion in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAw 24 (1974), and au-
thorities cited therein.
85. Id.
86. 230 La. 327, 88 So. 2d 387 (1956).
87. 183 La. 838, 165 So. 6 (1936).
88. 138 La. 361, 70 So. 326 (1915).
89. 346 So. 2d 694 (La. 1977).
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State v. Frentz,0 the court in footnote, without citing the
George decision, took a position contrary to George. The Frentz
case declares the Howard approach "erroneous" and approves
the position taken in Pace. It is hoped that Howard will not
hereafter be resuscitated and that the Frentz position will pre-
vail.
Prior Conviction-Pendency of Appeal
Does the fact that an appeal is pending relative to a wit-
ness's prior conviction of crime preclude use of that informa-
tion for impeachment purposes? Noting that the question was
one of first impression in Louisiana, a unanimous supreme
court in State v. Rhodes9' held that the pendency of the appeal
does not preclude use for impeachment, but that the trier of
fact may be informed of the appeal's pendency. In so holding,
the court relied upon the majority position elsewhere in the
country 2 and the position taken in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 3
90. 354 So. 2d 1007, 1011 n.2 (La. 1978).
91. 351 So. 2d 103 (La. 1977).
92. In this connection the court cited and relied on the following authorities: C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 53, § 43, at 87 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 726 (1967).
The court cited and quoted from United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 108 (1973), for
a succinct summary of the reasons for the majority view:
[T]he defendant has at least some means of qualifying the effect of the use
of such a conviction since he can explain that it is under appeal . . . whereas
an absolute rule of exclusion would totally deprive the Government of the use
of the impeaching material despite the extremely high proportion of affirmances
on criminal appeals. Furthermore, courts have stressed the greater probative
value of relatively recent convictions. . .; yet these are the very ones most likely
to be under appeal. When . . . the appeal presents a constitutional issue, the
process can lead all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, and an
absolute rule of exclusion would render such a conviction unavailable for im-
peachment for several years. In addition, a rule mandating exclusion of convic-
tions still on appeal might well encourage frivolous appeals and dilatory tactics
by defendants seeking to avoid the use of prior convictions for impeachment in
pending criminal actions. Similarly, prosecutors intending to use recent prior
convictions for impeachment might seek to delay trial until an appeal of the
earlier judgment had been decided.
351 So. 2d at 104.
93. FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
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SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY
Reference to Fact Witness Took, and Presumably Passed, Lie
Detector Test
In a well-reasoned opinion in State v. Davis4 the court,
through Chief Justice Sanders, held that defendant's convic-
tion for armed robbery must be reversed because of improper
reference to a lie detector test. The trial court, over objection,
had permitted the state, in support of the credibility of its star
witness, to bring out that the witness, following the alleged
armed robbery, had taken a lie detector test at the request of
her employer and had been continued as an employee. In this
connection, the court stated:
[W]e are forced to conclude that not only was error com-
mitted but that the error committed substantially preju-
diced the defendant and was, therefore, reversible.
LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 921. In the present case, by eliciting
impermissible testimony to the effect that the witness had
taken a lie detector test and establishing that she had
been retained in her employment, the State created the
impression that the witness took the test; told the truth;
and, therefore, was testifying truthfully at the trial. 5
If it is accepted in Louisiana that, absent stipulation, the re-
sults of lie detector tests are inadmissible," then references to
such tests from which the results are naturally inferred should
normally be excluded as well.
EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
Violation of Sequestration Order
State v. Jones,97 a very significant decision authored by
Justice Dennis, represents a sharp break with past cases rela-
tive to exclusion of defense witnesses for violation of a seques-
94. 351 So. 2d 771 (La. 1977).
95. Id. at 774.
96. See State v. Refuge, 264 La. 135, 270 So. 2d 842 (1972), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L.
REV. 443, 448 (1974), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 126.
97. 354 So. 2d 530 (La. 1978).
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tration order.18 Relying on a long line of federal cases, the court
held that because of defendant's state" and federal"" rights to
compulsory process and to present a defense, a trial court may
not properly exclude defendant's witness from testifying be-
cause of violation of a sequestration order absent "the consent,
connivance, procurement or knowledge of the defendant or his
counsel."I1
The writers fully agree with the court's analysis of the
federal constitutional problem, but for reasons set forth in an
earlier article, 10 would go further and argue that Louisiana's
statutory provisions' authorize contempt as the only coercive
remedy.,04
A very interesting civil case concerning the sanction for
violation of a sequestration order is Hopkins v. Department of
Highways, '01 a decision authored by Judge Domengeaux for the
Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Hopkins held that although the
trial court in its discretion could, because of violation of a
sequestration order, properly exclude testimony of expert wit-
nesses, it had abused its discretion in not permitting defendant
to be given the opportunity to have different experts familiarize
themselves with the facts underlying plaintiffs' claims and tes-
tify in rebuttal with respect to same.
98. For a discussion of the position earlier taken by the court, see The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv. 567,
594 (1978).
99. L .CONST. art. I, § 16.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
101. State v. Jones, 354 So. 2d 530, 532 (La. 1978). The required test was argua-
bly found to have been met in the later case of State v. Western, 355 So. 2d 1314 (La.
1978). See the concurrence of Justice Dennis, 355 So. 2d at 1322 (Dennis, J., concur-
ring).
102. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977
Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv. 567, 594 (La. 1978).
103. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 21, 22 and 764.
104. Of \course, as recognized in Hopkins v. Department of Highways, 350 So. 2d
1271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), the fact of violation of a sequestration order could be
brought out on cross-examination to attack the credibility of the witness. To preserve
a defendant's right of confrontation, perhaps the exclusion of state's witnesses would
be a needed remedy under certain circumstances.
105. 350 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
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OPINION
Expert Opinion-Qualification Required to Estimate
Vehicular Speed from Use of "Template"
State v. Self'" was a negligent homicide prosecution aris-
ing out of a motor vehicle accident in which a state policeman
had been killed. Reflecting an expressed "distrust of vehicular
speed determination evidence in criminal cases,"' 17 a majority
of the supreme court held that the trial court committed re-
versible error in permitting a state police officer to qualify and
testify "as an expert in the field of determining the speed of
motor vehicles involved in collisions" when "the witness ad-
mitted that he was not an expert at estimating the speed of
vehicles from collision damage, and he conceded that he did
not understand the derivation of the speed calculation formu-
lae upon which the template is based.' 1 8 Following State v.
Rogers'" the court held it improper to permit a prosecution
witness to give an opinion of vehicular speed based upon the
use of a template when he did not understand the theory under-
lying its use. In a very well-written opinion, Justice Dennis
fully demonstrated the complexity of the factors involved in
estimating vehicular speed from skidmarks, etc. A jury, of
course, would have great difficulty in evaluating the accuracy
of such an expert's conclusion, and the supreme court appar-
ently wants to be very sure that before such testimony is intro-
duced, the purported expert is in fact thoroughly competent.
The court appears particularly interested in protecting a defen-
dant in a criminal case against the possibility of error.
PRIVILEGE
Attorney-Client Privilege-Availability in Succession
Proceedings
In Succession of Norton1'0 the court recognized that the
106. 353 So. 2d 1282 (La. 1977).
107. Id. at 1284.
108. Id. at 1283.
109. 324 So. 2d 358 (La. 1976).
110. 351 So. 2d 107 (La. 1977).
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attorney-client privilege provided by Civil Code article 2283"'
generally survives the death of the client. It held, however, that
where in a succession proceeding the executor of the beneficiar-
ies named in the will seeks access to a testator's attorney-client
records for the purpose of upholding his will, descendants not
named in the will should not be permitted to assert the
attorney-client privilege to block access to the records. The
writers fully agree. A privilege created to protect a person's
communications with his attorney should not be available to
prevent access to records sought by his executor for the purpose
of supporting the legality of his testamentary declarations.
Privilege Against Self-incrimination- Who May Assert
The privilege against self-incrimination is normally per-
sonal to the witness, and it is for him to decide whether to
assert or waive it. A problem arises where the witness is a
minor.
In State v. Lawson' 2 the trial court, to protect a teenage
minor, an alleged co-participant in the crime who had been
called by the defendant as a witness, appointed counsel to
advise her as to her privilege against self-incrimination. Fol-
lowing a conference with the attorney, rather than the witness's
claiming the privilege, the attorney claimed it on behalf of the
witness. Apparently to insure that defendant's right of compul-
sory process had not been violated, a divided court remanded
the case to the trial court to determine whether the witness
would have invoked the privilege herself, thus emphasizing the
personal nature of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Privilege Against Self-incrimination- Grant of "Use"
Immunity
Article 439.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted
by the Louisiana Legislature in 1972,"11 provides that under
certain preconditions, despite a witness's claimer of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, he may, via the grant of "use"
111. LA. CiM. CODE art. 2283.
112. 359 So. 2d 964 (La. 1978).
113. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1, added by 1972 La. Acts, No. 410, § 1.
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immunity, be required to answer a question posed to him. In
re Parker"4 concerned the state's invocation of the statute to
force the brother of the defendant in a murder case to answer
questions relative to the alleged murder weapon. The state
contended that the weapon had been stolen by the witness and
given to the defendant shortly before the homicide and claimed
that the witness had earlier so stated to the police. Despite
promised immunity as to the theft of the pistol, the witness
refused to answer, claiming that his answer might implicate
him in the murder. The state understandably was unwilling to
grant the witness full immunity as to any answer he might give
relative to the weapon, for it feared that the witness might,
under a grant of immunity, admit to having committed the
murder himself and thus raise a doubt as to the defendant's
guilt. Noting that the witness had stated that he would recant
his earlier statement given to the police and that his current
position was that he possessed the pistol in question before and
after the date of the murder, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the tendered immunity was insufficient to negate the wit-
ness's privilege. Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Sum-
mers, in a well-reasoned opinion, stated that the privilege
against self-incrimination is to be liberally construed: "[t]o
sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implica-
tion of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer would disclose facts which could be used
against the witness in a future prosecution for crime.""' Find-
ing that there was a "rational connection" between the wit-
ness's possible answer to the district attorney's question and
the witness's implication in the alleged murder, the proffered
immunity was insufficient to protect the witness's privilege
against self-incrimination. The writers fully agree.
It is interesting to speculate whether under the defendant's
right of compulsory process"' and in light of the statute author-
izing the prosecution to compel testimony via "use" immunity,
114. 357 So. 2d 508 (La. 1978).
115. Id. at 513.
116. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See also State v. Jones, 354 So.
2d 530 (La. 1978); State v. Kellogg, 350 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977); State v. Conerly, 342
So. 2d 671 (La. 1977); State v. Bolton, 337 So. 2d 446 (La. 1976).
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a defendant in such circumstances might have successfully
demanded that such a witness be forced to answer like ques-
tions under a grant of "use" immunity. No jurisdiction has
appeared to go so far, but there is speculation among writers
concerning the possibility."7
Inference from Claimer of Privilege
When the prosecution in a criminal case knows that a
defendant will assert a valid privilege as to all of a witness's
relevant testimony, may it nonetheless properly call the wit-
ness to the stand and force the defendant to claim his privilege
in the presence of the jury?"' Although it does not so hold, an
implication can fairly be drawn from State v. Bennett ' 9 that
such conduct on the part of the prosecution would be improper.
Knowing that the defendant would assert the confidential con-
nubial communication privilege with respect to certain testi-
mony by his wife, the prosecution nonetheless called the wife
to the stand. Under the particular circumstances of the case,
the court found that the conduct of the prosecution had not
been improper. Importantly, the court reasoned that the dis-
trict judge had not committed error in finding that the testi-
mony given by the witness spouse-testimony not subject to
the confidential connubial privilege-was relevant and admis-
sible. The court did not state that the prosecution under differ-
ent circumstances would be entitled to have the jury observe a
defendant claim the confidential connubial privilege. Instead,
it implied that if a witness spouse has no relevant admissible
117. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 167
(1974); Comment, A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use For
Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEGIs. 74, 79 (1972). See also United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d
1079 (9th Cir. 1976); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
118. For discussion on forcing a witness to assert his privilege before the jury and
inferences to be drawn from assertion of privilege, see The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 598 (1977),
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 237; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REv. 525, 542 (1975), reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 5, at 214; and Note, The Use of a Witness's Privilege for the Benefit
of a Defendant, 37 LA. L. REV. 1244 (1977). See also FED. R. EVID. 513 as originally
adopted by the Unites States Supreme Court, but later rejected by Congress, and the
accompanying comments, at 56 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1972).
119. 357 So. 2d 1136 (La. 1978).
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testimony to offer aside from that covered by the confidential
connubial privilege, forcing the defendant to assert his privi-
lege in the presence of the jury is improper.
The court went further and clearly stated that the district
attorney's comment in closing argument relative to the defen-
dant's assertion of his confidential connubial privilege was
improper; however, under the circumstances, including the
trial judge's admonition to disregard the prosecutorial com-
ment, it did not necessitate reversal. Two justices dissented on
this point, taking the position that the improper prosecutorial
comment was so prejudicial that it constituted reversible error.
The Bennett decision is important not only as to the confi-
dential connubial communication privilege, but in other areas
as well. Presumably the court will hold that no adverse infer-
ence is properly to be drawn from a criminal defendant's asser-
tion of a valid privilege. The continued authority of State v.
McMullan2 ° (concerning the propriety of the prosecution's
calling a witness who, it has been informed, will claim a privi-
lege and forcing the witness to assert his privilege before the
jury) appears in serious doubt.'
NEW EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR LOUISIANA?
Statements Made During Period of Detention Where Right to
Counsel Not Accorded
What is the remedy for violation of the statutory provision
requiring that within a maximum of seventy-two hours an ar-
rested person shall be brought before a judge for appointment
of counsel, etc.?'22 The statute provides that if this provision is
not complied with the defendant shall be "released forthwith."
But what remedy does a defendant have if he is neither brought
before the judge within the prescribed time nor released
forthwith? Justice Tate in a concurring opinion to a writ denial
120. 223 La. 629, 66 So. 2d 574 (1953), discussed in Note, Evidence-The
Husband-Wife Testimony Privilege, 14 LA. L. REv. 427 (1954), reprinted in G. PUGH,
LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 173 (1974).
121. See discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-
1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REv. 575, 598 (1977), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
5, at 237.
122. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 230.1, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 395, § 1.
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in State v. Daigle1"3 suggested persuasively that statements
secured from a defendant during such period should be inad-
missible against him. Such an exclusionary rule would be very
similar to the McNabb-Mallory rule adopted many years ago
by the United States Supreme Court.'
HEARSAY
Definition
In State v. Martin' the court recognized that Louisiana
statutes provide no authoritative definition of "hearsay" and
that to determine what is or is not hearsay is not always an easy
matter. 2 ' The court then adopted the definition suggested by
Professor McCormick: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in
court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court,
the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth
of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. C. McCormick, Evi-
dence, § 246 (Cleary ed. 1972)."I27
Hearsay v. Non-Hearsay-Police Radio Broadcasts
May the prosecution in a criminal case, over a hearsay
objection, properly adduce evidence by a police officer as to the
detailed description of the reported perpetrator of the crime
that he had received over the police radio prior to the arrest?
Further, may the prosecution properly adduce evidence that
the arresting officer had arrested defendant because defendant
fit the description that the police officer had received over the
police radio? A majority of the court in State v. Mitchell' 28 (a
123. 353 So. 2d 287 (La. 1977).
124. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 53, § 155, at 337, which, inter alia, discusses
the impact and constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1968), which purports to limit
the impact of the rule.
125. 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978).
126. See Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Crimi-
nal Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954), reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW
412 (1974). See also State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV.
567, 582 (1978).
127. 356 So. 2d at 1373-74.
128. 356 So. 2d 974 (La. 1978).
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rape case) indicated that in both instances the prosecution
may, reasoning that the evidence is non-hearsay-that it is
admissible as fact of utterance rather than utterance of fact.
With deference, the writers submit that such evidence should
be classified as inadmissible hearsay; the fact that the arrest-
ing officer heard a description of the reported perpetrator of the
crime on the radio does not remove it from the realm of hear-
say. It must be conceded, however, that there are cases indicat-
ing the contrary result. 2'
There is no general exception for complaints received by
police officers. Thus, generally a police officer as a witness on
the stand may not, over a hearsay objection, properly relate a
complaint he had received from the alleged victim that a per-
son fitting a certain designated description committed the rob-
bery.'0 Likewise, a second officer who was told of such descrip-
tion by the first officer could not as a witness relate it on the
stand. For the same reason, the fact that the second officer
might have received the report from the first officer by radio is
of no moment. The fact of such description would, of course,
explain why the arresting officer arrested the defendant. But
at a trial on the merits, as opposed to a motion to suppress, the
officer's conduct in making the arrest is normally immaterial.
If as a result of cross-examination or otherwise the propriety of
the officer's conduct became an issue in the case, then the fact
that he had received such information might become relevant
non-hearsay. In general, however, in the state's case in chief
the reason for the officer's arresting the defendant and the
officer's state of mind is immaterial.
Prior Statement by Witness on Stand
In an excellent discussion of the problem, Justice Dennis
in State v. Martin'3' adhered to the traditional position that
129. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 606 (1977), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra
note 5, at 530. See also State v. Tucker, 354 So. 2d 521 (La. 1978).
130. See State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567, 582
(1978).
131. 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978).
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testimony by a witness on the stand as to his own out-of-court
statement offered to prove the truth of the statement is none-
theless hearsay and must fit within an exception to the hearsay
rule to be admissible.'32 After a careful analysis of Louisiana
and other authorities, the court concluded: "often an erroneous
ruling admitting an unsworn out-of-court assertion by a testify-
ing witness will not present grounds for reversal, but the hear-
say character of a proffered out-of-court assertion is not altered
by the fact that the statement was made by a person who
appears in court as a witness."'33
Confessions-Foundation for Voluntariness-Impact of
Intoxication
What is the impact of inebriation on the free and voluntary
requirement for admissibility of a confession? Traditionally,
the law has been unsympathetic to the plight of the accused
whose tongue at the time of the confession was loosened by self-
induced inebriation.' 34
In State v. Rankin135 the court continued to set forth an
exacting requirement for exclusion of a confession because of
intoxication, stating:
Where the free and voluntary nature of a confession is
challenged on the ground that he was intoxicated at the
time of interrogation, the confession will be rendered inad-
missible only when the intoxication is of such a degree as
132. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourne rev. 1977) (collecting
recent cases both approving and disfavoring the traditional view). See also State v.
Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567, 582 (1978), and the
materials therein collected.
133. 356 So. 2d at 1374. In so holding, the court expressly disapproved sporadic
intimations to the contrary in the following earlier cases: State v. Monroe, 345 So. 2d
1185 (La. 1977); State v. Launey, 335 So. 2d 435 (La. 1976); State v. Hayes, 306 So.
2d 705 (La. 1975); State v. Jacobs, 281 So. 2d 713 (La. 1973); Southern Scrap Material
Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Scrap Materials Corp., 239 La. 958, 120 So. 2d 491 (1960).
134. See State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So. 2d 369 (1969), and State v.
Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So. 2d 232 (1949). For the law in other jurisdictions, see
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 361 (1960).
135. 357 So. 2d 803 (La. 1978).
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to negate defendant's comprehension and to render him
unconscious of the consequences of what he is saying.'36
Significantly, however, the court went on to hold that the con-
fession in question was inadmissible, finding that the prosecu-
tion had failed to sustain its burden of showing that the confes-
sion involved had been freely and voluntarily made.
A police officer called by defendant had testified that at
the time of defendant's arrest and prior to the making of the
confession, defendant had appeared "intoxicated and diso-
riented, confused and irrational.' 37 The state had itself called
no witnesses to show that the confession was free and volun-
tary; it had introduced the confession on cross-examination of
the police officer called by defendant. Quite properly, the court
held that the state had failed to sustain its burden of proof on
the voluntariness issue.
The court went on to state: "The evidence is clear that
defendant was not capable of understanding his Miranda rights
and making a free and voluntary confession due to his intoxi-
cated condition.' 38 Rarely have courts found, as in Rankin,
that the inebriation of the confessor precluded the admissibil-
ity of the confession. Further, the last quoted language seems
more sympathetic to the inebriated confessor than that of the
test traditionally formulated.
Confessions- Coercion by Private Persons
In State v. Nelson'39 the court in dictum took the position
that an involuntary confession is inadmissible whether the ac-
tion precipitating the involuntary confession was by police offi-
cers or private individuals. Although the case arose in the
shoplifter context,'40 the language of the opinion goes much
further, indicating that any evidence obtained as a result of an
136. Id. at 804. Justice Dennis, in his concurring opinion, objected to such a
formulation and said that he preferred the approach taken on the voluntariness issue
in State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1977).
137. 357 So. 2d at 804.
138. Id. at 805.
139. 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
140. See LA. CODF CRIM. P. art. 215.
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unreasonable search and seizure, by whomever made, is inad-
missible in Louisiana."'
Confession of Codefendant Which Implicates
Defendant-Limiting Instruction
Serious questions relative to a defendant's right of confron-
tation and his right to a fair trial are presented when a defen-
dant and a codefendant are jointly tried and the confession of
the codefendant implicating both himself and the defendant is
offered in evidence against the codefendant. Is a defendant
sufficiently protected by an instruction that the jury is to use
the confession only against the codefendant? The majority in
Bruton v. United States' held that when a codefendant does
not take the stand and a confession by the codefendant impli-
cating both defendant and codefendant has been introduced
against the codefendant, an instruction to the jury that the
codefendant's confession is to be used solely against the code-
fendant is insufficient protection for the defendant.' In this
connection the court stated: "Plainly, the introduction of [the
codefendant's] confession added substantial, perhaps even
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject
to cross-examination, since [the codefendant] did not take the
stand. Petitioner thus was denied his constitutional right of
confrontation."' 4 Is the same rule to be applied when codefen-
dant in fact takes the stand and tells substantially the same
story as the defendant? In Nelson v. O'Neill" the confessing
codefendant took the stand, told the same story as defendant,
denied having made the confession implicating both himself
and defendant, and stated that the facts contained in the al-
leged confession were untrue. A divided court held that under
the circumstances, defendant's right of confrontation was not
violated. The court stated that "where a codefendant takes the
stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court
141. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
142. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
143. See also Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
144. 391 U.S. at 127-28, as quoted in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 628 (1971).
145. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
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statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify
favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the
defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments."' 46 Justices Brennan, Douglas and
Marshall argued persuasively in dissent that the concern un-
derlying the decision in Bruton should likewise control in
Nelson. They contended that the reason underlying the Bruton
holding was the "substantial risk that the jury, despite instruc-
tions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining [Bruton's] guilt"'47 and that a sim-
ilar danger had been present in the trial in Nelson. In a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall urged the need for
new rules in joint trials and enthusiastically supported the
American Bar Association Standards in this connec-
tion-proposals that would force the prosecution in such cases
as Bruton and Nelson to grant a severance, delete reference to
defendant in codefendant's confession, or not introduce the
confession."'
A fascinating version of the problem was presented to the
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Harvey. 4 As in Nelson
v. O'Neil, the codefendant whose confession the state wished
to introduce in Harvey took the stand and repudiated the con-
fession; however, instead of affirming the story told by defen-
dant, he told yet a different story, claiming that he knew noth-
ing whatsoever about the alleged homicide for which they were
both on trial. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court's
instruction to limit use of the codefendant's confession to code-
fendant only was insufficient protection of defendant's state
and federal rights of confrontation. Rejecting defendant's argu-
ments, the court distinguished Bruton and took the position
that since codefendant had taken the stand, defendant's rights
of confrontation had not been violated.
With deference, the writers urge that the law in this area
be reexamined by the court. The writers agree that the Harvey
146. Id. at 629-30 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 633 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
148. ABA STANDARDS, Joinder and Severance § 2.3(a) (1968).
149. 358 So. 2d 1224 (1978).
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case is not necessarily controlled by Bruton, for unlike Bruton,
the codefendant in Harvey took the stand. But of course the
fact that Bruton does not require exclusion of the statement
does not necessitate its admissibility in Louisiana.
Analytically, the first question to be resolved is the admis-
sibility in the state's case in chief of the codefendant's confes-
sion implicating not only himself but defendant as well. The
confession of the codefendant is, as to the defendant, inadmis-
sible hearsay, and in Louisiana this is true even though the
codefendant thereafter takes the stand in his own behalf.50 The
writers believe that the fear expressed in Bruton-that the jury
may not follow the limiting instruction-is well grounded and
that the danger is not significantly reduced by the fact that the
codefendant later takes the stand, at least where the codefen-
dant on the stand denies having made the alleged confession.
If codefendant does in fact take the stand and reiterates that
part of his earlier confession implicating the defendant, then
it may be that the earlier admissibility of codefendant's confes-
sion would become harmless error, but such a circumstance
would be unusual indeed.
Except insofar as the codefendant's testimony in Harvey
contradicted testimony by an alleged conspirator that the con-
spirator, together with defendant and codefendant, had
planned the armed robbery which culminated in the death of
the victim, the codefendant's testimony on the stand did not
support defendant's version of the incident, and thus it is sub-
mitted that the Harvey case is significantly unlike Nelson. But
whether or not the United States Supreme Court would thus
distinguish Nelson and hold that defendant's federal right of
confrontation was violated by the admission of codefendant's
jointly incriminating confession, it is submitted that Louis-
iana's confrontation clause, 5' its rule against the admissibility
of hearsay,'52 and its rule that generally a witness's out-of-court
150. See text at note 159, infra. See also State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977
Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567, 583 (1978).
151. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
152. LA. R.S. 15:434 (1950).
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statement is not to be given substantive effect'53 all militate in
favor of our adopting the position set forth in the American Bar
Association Standards.
Res Gestae-Prerequisite for Admissibility
A divided court held in State v. Millet'54 that in order to
introduce testimony of an out-of-court statement by a third
party as part of the res gestae, the state must show by evidence
aliunde the proffered statement that the charged crime in fact
took place. Otherwise, as the court indicated, there would be a
"boot strap operation." The writers fully agree.
Public Records-Proof of Identity
A recurring problem in multiple offender hearings has
been establishing the fact of prior convictions. The first Curtis
case 55 held that coincidence of name as to defendant and the
person previously convicted is insufficient to establish identity,
and the French case" held that in habitual offender proceed-
ings identity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although various ways of proving identity are possible,'57 one
of the most enticing is via identity of fingerprints of the person
previously convicted and of the defendant in an habitual of-
fender proceeding.But because of the hearsay rule and the rule
requiring proper authentication of documents, establishing
such identity has given considerable trouble.' 8
153. See State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV.
306, 311 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 104.
154. 356 So. 2d 1380 (La. 1978).
155. State v. Curtis, 319 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567,567-
68 (1978).
156. City of Monroe v. French, 345 So. 2d 23 (La. 1977), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV.
567, 568 (1978).
157. See State v. Curtis, 338 So. 2d 662 (La. 1976), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567, 567-
68 (1978).
158. See State v. Martin, 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978); State v. Hamilton, 356 So.
2d 1360 (La. 1978); State v. Adams, 355 So. 2d 917 (La. 1978); State v. Demouchet,
353 So. 2d 1025 (La. 1978); State v. Barrow, 352 So. 2d 635 (La. 1978).
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One of the most important of the recent cases is State v.
Martin,'5 holding inadmissible "a fingerprint card from a
neighboring sheriff's office" which was "stamped 'a true copy
of the original on file in this office' and signed by an individual
identifying himself as 'Deputy Sheriff, Jefferson Parish,""' ' 60 As
to authentication of the document, the court said that nor-
mally the custodian of official records and the person issuing
acceptable certificates of authenticity must be identical, but
because of Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure article 331
to the effect that a deputy sheriff possesses all the powers of a
sheriff, a deputy sheriff may properly issue acceptable certified
copies of records in the sheriff's office. As the court properly
pointed out, however, such a certification by the deputy sheriff
meets the authentication objection only and does not answer
the underlying hearsay objection, and the court then went on
to hold that because of the hearsay objection, the proffered
records should have been excluded. The court said that Louis-
iana has not adopted a hearsay exception admitting public
records generally, but instead has enacted statutes creating
hearsay exceptions as to specific records,'"' and that "an over-
broad exception admitting into evidence all statements on file
with all public officers would have potential conflict with a
defendant's right to confrontation and allow introduction of
information derived from untrustworthy sources and through
unreliable methods."'' 2 The writers agree.
Presumably in response to Martin and other recent deci-
sions, the 1978 legislature enacted a statute'3 providing that
when a person is convicted of a felony, the trial judge "shall
For a case dealing with the analogous problem of proof of prior conviction of simple
robbery when defendant is charged under LA. R.S. 14:95.1 (Supp. 1975) with carrying
a concealed weapon by a person who has been convicted of simple robbery, see State
v. TiUman, 356 So. 2d 1376 (La. 1978), decided the same day as State v. Martin.
159. 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978).
160. Id. at 1374.
161. See Hawthorne, Business Records in Louisiana as an Exception to the Hear-
say Rule, 21 LA. L. REV. 449 (1961), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 542; Zwick,
Hearsay Evidence and the Federal Rules: Article VIII-IL. Exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule: Expanding the Limits of Admissibility, 36 LA. L. REV. 159, 169 (1975), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 5, at 505, 513.
162. 356 So. 2d at 1375.
163. 1978 La. Acts, No. 302, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 871.
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cause to be affixed to the bill of indictment or information the
fingerprints of the defendant against whom such judgment is
rendered"'' and shall certify that the fingerprints are those of
the defendant.65 The statute is narrowly drawn and, reasona-
bly interpreted, presumably requires that the fingerprints be
taken in open court in the presence of the judge. It is felt that
thus interpreted it would overcome confrontation objections. If
so, copies of such original documents properly certified by the
legal custodian should be equally admissible as the original. 6
It is believed that the 1978 act should go far to relieve the
problem encountered by the prosecution in establishing ident-
ity in habitual offender proceedings.
PRESERVING RIGHTS FOR APPEAL
Burden of Showing Requirements for Hearsay Exceptions Met
When a litigant offers hearsay evidence and the opponent
interposes a hearsay objection, does the proponent or opponent
have the burden of showing that the offered evidence meets or
does not meet the requirements for a designated hearsay
exception? Generally it is felt that the burden is on the propo-
nent, and certainly it would be the safer practice for a cautious
proponent to attempt to shoulder it. Somewhat surprisingly, in
State v. Williams6 7 the court stated that the trial court had
committed error in sustaining the state's objection to the ad-
missibility of certain hospital records, despite the absence of
any showing that defendant offeror had relied upon the hospi-
tal records exception to the hearsay rule' or called the trial
court's attention to the exception and despite the absence of a
showing that the statutory requirements of certification by an
appropriate official had been complied with. Additionally,
there had apparently been no offer of proof'6 9 of the hospital
164. Id.
165. See also LA. R.S. 15:529.1(F) (Supp. 1958 & 1978) relative to certification
of inmate records by penitentiary wardens, etc.
166. See LA. R.S. 15:457 (1950).
167. 346 So. 2d 181 (La. 1977).
168. LA. R.S. 13:3714 (Supp. 1966 & 1977).
169. See State v. George, 312 So. 2d 860 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. Rav. 651,
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records in question, and the supreme court hence did not have
the offered records before it. The supreme court held, however,
under the particular circumstances presented in the case, that
defendant had not been prejudiced by the trial court's error.
Contemporaneous Objection Rule-Effect of Failure to
Interpose Objection When Objectionable Evidence First
Adduced
If a litigant fails to interpose an objection to testimony as
to particular subject matter, is he thereby precluded from later
objecting to similar evidence as to the same subject matter?
State v. Lee'70 and State v. Millet' both answer in the negative
and the writers fully agree.
The contemporaneous objection rule12 embodied in article
841 of the Code of Criminal Procedure' generally serves a very
valuable function, forcing an aggrieved litigant to put his oppo-
nent on notice with respect to his purported violation of eviden-
tiary rules and giving the trial judge the opportunity to cure the
claimed impropriety. However, as Justice Calogero said, speak-
ing for a majority of the court in State v. Lee:'74
Article 841 is not an inflexible rule imposed on criminal
litigants without rationale or justification. . . . [T]he
fact that a prosecutor has made a prejudicial reference to
a previous trial without objection does not mean that he
can then exploit defense counsel's inattention or mistake
by repeated prejudicial comments in the same vein. Our
rules are not intended to be available for manipulation by
the defense or by the state. "'
A litigant's failure to assert an available objection should not
678 (1976), reprinted in G. PuGH, supra note 5, at 584.
170. 346 So. 2d 682 (La. 1977).
171. 356 So. 2d 1380 (La. 1978).
172. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REv. 525, 549 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 5,
at 588.
173. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 841.
174. 346 So. 2d 682 (La. 1977).
175. Id. at 684-85 (emphasis by the court).
['Vol. 39
1979] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978 991
be interpreted to mean that the non-objecting party perma-
nently waives objection to the objectionable subject matter, as
the court correctly concluded. The fact that no protest is made
when an opponent opens a forbidden door"' should not give the
opponent the right to use such door throughout the trial.
176. See text at note 1, supra.
